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<text> <title> (Jul. 06, 1992) Israeli Elections:Hold the Euphoria </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1992 July 06, 1992 Pills for the Mind </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> ISRAEL, Page 44 Hold the Euphoria </hdr> <body> Labor's victory could bring considerable new vigor to the Middle East peace negotiations, but reaching a solution is still a tough game By Lisa Beyer/Jerusalem--With reporting by Dean Fischer/Cairo and J.F.O. McAllister/Washington Arabs are ecstatic. Washington is pleased. Half, at least, of Israel is cheering. Compared with the alternative of a Shamir victory, Labor's electoral triumph is such good news for the Middle East peace process that deflating expectations almost seems churlish. Nevertheless, it is clear that attaining a comprehensive peace will be no romp in the garden for Labor leader Yitzhak Rabin when he becomes Prime Minister, even though his promise to accelerate negotiations brings a real commitment--always lacking in Shamir--to address the substance of a settlement. As all parties prepare for the next round of talks to get under way in Rome, it is easy to forget just who Rabin is. He is, after all, the former Defense Minister who ordered his army to use "force, strength and blows" to stop the intifadeh. He is the ex-general who, during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, proposed tightening up the siege on Beirut by cutting off food and water to the populace. This reserved, taciturn man is no tender heart, no dove. Still, the ebullient mood in most capitals reflects optimism that Rabin can make a difference. Despite his record--or perhaps because of it--he may be far more able than Shamir to come to terms with the Arabs. He has pledged not only to grant substantial autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in the immediate future, but also to give back at least part of the land itself one day. And because of his demonstrated toughness, he is trusted by his compatriots to make a deal that will not sell Israel out. An agreement on autonomy ought to be reasonably easy to reach. While Shamir's government did little to narrow the gap between its modest notions of self-rule and the demands by the Palestinians for a virtually sovereign state, Rabin suggests he will offer a relatively generous deal, giving the Palestinians control over everything but security, foreign affairs, borders and Jewish settlements. The danger is that the Palestinians, flushed with hope, will demand still more. But with Washington in full accord, Rabin could well fulfill his campaign promise to strike a deal within a year. The key move for both Washington and the Palestinians is Rabin's intention to slow the growth of Jewish settlements in the territories. He rejects the all-out freeze that the Palestinians have demanded and the Bush Administration would prefer, but has made plans to abolish financial incentives for building what he calls "political settlements"--those in populated Palestinian areas that the Labor Party might one day relinquish in a land-for-peace swap. That alone should improve Israel's strained relations with Washington and prod the Bush Administration into reconsidering the $10 billion in loan guarantees Jerusalem wants to help resettle Russian Jews. Insofar as the settlement imbroglio was part of a campaign to show Israeli voters that the U.S. relationship was in jeopardy under Shamir, it has done its work. In part, the President simply likes Rabin better than the stubborn Shamir; moreover, caught in a tough presidential race, Bush would like to repair his relations with American Jewish voters. But a renewed coziness between the U.S. and Israel may cost Washington some of the credibility it gained in the Arab world when it balked on the guarantees. At the same time, Rabin's plan to focus his peace efforts on the Palestinians, leaving Israel's conflict with the Syrians for later, may, according to some Middle East watchers, provoke Damascus to try to disrupt the negotiations. Of all Israel's neighbors, the Syrians were the least enthusiastic about Rabin's victory. Some experts believe Damascus views the results with fear and loathing because any rapprochement between Jerusalem and Washington is regarded as a loss of influence for Syria. Others insist that President Hafez Assad may seize the opportunity offered by Rabin's election to show more flexibility, in order to steer the negotiations in a direction more to his liking. Whatever Syria's direction, for any progress to be made, all the Arabs will have to match Rabin in moderation. The most auspicious new element in the peace process is Rabin's belief in territorial compromise, but that it is the hardest thing to accomplish. Polls show that large numbers of Israelis continue to oppose land concessions, and the relatively hawkish Rabin rejects the idea of returning all the territory captured during the 1967 war. But, says Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak, "you won't be hearing from the Israeli spokesmen anymore about the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael," a catchphrase in Israel that includes the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For the moment, the election results suggest that the national consensus for Rabin's view is strong. Yet the anger and anxiety of the 120,000 Jewish settlers, not to mention Likud's solid minority, remain an impediment to any permanent solution. The hope is that Rabin is smart and tough enough to keep Jewish opposition in check. His previous tenure as Prime Minister in the mid-1970s was plodding and inept and ended in scandal. Friends say he has changed. And so, perhaps, have a majority of Israelis, who now appear to be more interested in solving the Arab conflict than in worshipping an ideology. </body> </article> </text>